




SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
 
 
Protection of Women’s Marital Property 
Rights upon the Dissolution of a 
Customary Marriage in South Africa: A 





Elena Moore and Chuma Himonga 
 
 









Published by the Centre for Social Science Research 



















About the authors: 
 
Elena Moore is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology and a Senior Researcher 
at the Centre for Social Science Research, at UCT. 
 
Chuma Himonga is Professor of Law at the University of Cape Town 
(UCT) and the National Research Foundation Chair in Customary Law at 





This work is based upon research supported by the South African 
Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of Science and Technology 
and the National Research Foundation. The Chair is hosted by the 
University of Cape Town, funded by the DST and administered by the 
NRF. The research described in this article is drawn from a larger 
research project on the Operation of the Reformed Customary Law in 
Practice: The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and Rules of 




Protection of Women’s Marital Property 
Rights upon the Dissolution of a 
Customary Marriage in South Africa: A 








Based on an empirical study of marital dissolution, this paper examines the 
effectiveness of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 and its 
enforcing institutions to provide the necessary protection of women’s marital 
property rights when customary marriages end. Drawing on data from court 
(divorce) files and semi-structured interviews, the paper will examine the 
effectiveness of the new laws for individuals who seek to regulate marital 
dissolution through both judicial and extra judicial systems. In doing so, it 
examines how judicial and extrajudicial systems interact and co-exist. The 
findings show that both systems of regulation are failing to recognise women’s 
right to an equitable distribution of the marital estate upon divorce. The paper 
demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in the judicial regulation of divorce 
combined with the consequences of the continued private regulation of marital 
dissolution. Resistance to an equal division of marital assets continues and a 
more dedicated and systematic effort is required to curb financial exploitation 
upon the dissolution of a customary marriage if the State wants women living 





‘I married my husband in community of property. The house we are 
living in was my husband’s inheritance from his family. I recently 
filed for divorce and my husband refuses to sell the house, stating that 
it is his inheritance. What can I do in that situation?’ 
 
‘I would go to court, you've signed and you've agreed. They should 
help you in court because there's nothing you can say to him because 




‘If you handle them [property disputes] in terms of customary law, 
believe me, you don’t have any problems because we [traditional 
leaders] understand. But if you want to apply that [new law], you take 
50 per cent and that is when you get problems.’  
 
The first quote, a concern expressed by a member of a discussion group held in a 
rural area in the South African province, Limpopo, expresses an uncertainty 
about whether the marital home, which the former husband was the heir of the 
family property where the couple had lived for over 15 years, was considered 
marital property at the time of a divorce. The two other quotes provide possible 
ways in which the participant can deal with the dispute by drawing on judicial or 
extrajudicial systems.  As South Africa is a legal pluralist state, it has a system 
of regulation comprising both judicial and extrajudicial systems. In this case, it 
is unclear how customary forms of property are understood and dealt with by the 
judicial system and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 did little 
to clarify the position of such family property (Mbatha, 2005: 45). The 
customary heir cannot be treated as the ‘owner’ of the property. This property 
belongs to the family and is for the use of everyone in need, not just the nuclear 
family of the deceased (Mbatha, 2005; Weeks, 2011).  It is expected that other 
members of the paternal family may have a claim to this property and they may 
face problems in accessing their claim to this property if the property is divided 
amongst the marital couple.  
 
This is just one practical example of how judicial and extrajudicial systems that 
co-exist will need to interact to resolve this specific problem. The Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act 1998 (hereafter RCMA), recognises customary 
marriages and improves the position of African women.  As Mamashela wrote, 
“the RCMA seeks to address the inherent inequality between spouses in 
customary marriages by bringing their personal and proprietary consequences 
into line with the Constitution” (2004: 632).  
 
The RCMA permits customary forums of dispute resolution to mediate marital 
disputes but requires decrees of divorce to be granted by the court.1 Thus, 
customary marriage spouses can utilise both judicial and extrajudicial systems 
when seeking assistance with disputes relating to the financial consequences of 
the dissolution of a marriage but they can only have their customary marriage 
dissolved at the court.2 The two systems may offer different solutions and, in a 
                                         
1
 Sections 8 (1) and (5). 
2 According to Section 1 of the 1998 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, a ‘court’ 
means a High Court of South Africa, a family court established under any law or a Divorce 
Court established in terms of section 10 of the Administration Amendment Act, 1929 (Act 9 
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legal pluralist state, an individual can draw on the resolution which best suits 
their needs (Griffiths, 1997; Higgins et al., 2007). With the many and often 
contradictory laws and authorities under which spouses from customary 
marriages regulate their financial lives (Weeks, 2011) following the dissolution 
of a customary marriage, this paper examines who issues the final judgement 
and makes the law in relation to the division of matrimonial property. How do 
judicial and extrajudicial systems support or challenge each other when deciding 
the financial consequences of marital dissolution and how do both systems 
protect women’s marital property rights?  
 
Based on an empirical study of the experience of marital dissolution, including a 
review of 30 divorce cases, this paper examines the financial consequences of 
the dissolution of marriage through both judicial and extrajudicial systems. We 
will begin by briefly outlining the legal and demographic context in which the 
dissolution of a customary marriage occurs. After that we will describe the 
research methods adopted for the study before presenting the findings of the 
financial consequences of marital dissolution as it is currently operating inside 
and outside the courts. The final section will discuss the challenges of regulating 
marital dissolution in a legal pluralist state by providing a clearer understanding 
of the shortcomings of judicial and extrajudicial regulation of the division of 
marital assets.  
 
 
2. Dissolving Customary Marriages: The 
interrelationship between judicial and 
extrajudicial systems 
 
The pre-1994 South African legal system was characterised by dualism in the 
laws governing the institution of marriage. It was permissible for all races to 
marry under common law.3 However, official customary law, most of which 
comprised an oppressive form of customary law developed by the colonial and 
apartheid states as the backbone of segregation policies, applied to the majority 
of marriages of black people. Moreover, the customary law of marriage 
occupied an inferior position to common law as state law hardly recognised the 
customary union in comparison to the marriage entered into in accordance with 
the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, which was fully recognised. As Nhlapo argued, 
‘Black’ South African women have historically been positioned “outside the 
                                                                                                                               
of 1929). The introduction in 2010 of regional courts with family jurisdiction is 
acknowledged. The paper will use this definition (as amended) throughout. 
3 For the purposes of this paper, common law denotes South African law of western origin, 
i.e. legislation, case law and Roman Dutch Law. 
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law” (1995: 162). The colonial authorities introduced the Black Administration 
Act (BAA) in 1927 and it remained in force during the apartheid period 
(Deveaux, 2003). Several of its provisions rendered women more economically 
vulnerable in the event of marital breakdown.4 Under the BAA, women were 
denied the right to acquire and own property in their own right. The BAA 
accorded customary union husbands absolute ownership of household property, 
which included the personal property and earnings of their wives (Bennett, 
1991) -- this property legally accrued to customary union husbands in the event 
of the dissolution or nullification of the customary union. Moreover, under the 
BAA women were regarded as perpetual minors under the guardianship of either 
their male relatives or husbands. Access to courts was limited as women could 
not litigate without consent of or assistance by their legal guardians. This limited 
their ability to use state courts to claim remedies which existed under customary 
law, against their husbands. 
 
The division of matrimonial property upon divorce in South Africa was 
protected with the introduction of the RCMA. The spouses of a customary 
marriage are deemed to be married in community of property, subject to their 
freedom to alter this by ante nuptial contract and subject to the current state rules 
permitting courts to order an equitable distribution of their estates upon divorce. 
Section 7(2) of the RMCA states: 
 
‘(2) A customary marriage entered into after the commencement of 
this Act in which a spouse is not a partner in any other existing 
customary marriage (i.e. monogamous customary marriage), is a 
marriage in community of property and of profit and loss between the 
spouses, unless such consequences are specifically excluded by the 
spouses in an ante nuptial contract which regulates the matrimonial 
property system of their marriage.’ 
 
In essence, marrying in community of property is the automatic proprietary 
regime. These reforms have meant that, except for a few exceptions, both 
spouses married under customary law jointly own and have equal powers of 
administration over all property acquired before and during the marriage 
(Himonga, 2005; Nhlapo and Himonga, 2014).  
 
The RCMA however provides for different proprietary consequences depending 
on when the customary marriage came into question. According to Section 7(1) 
of the 1998 Act, the rules governing the division of assets following the 
dissolution of a marriage differ for marriages which were concluded before the 
                                         
4 In KwaZulu Natal, the Natal Code of Zulu Law and the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu 
Law played a similar role. The discussion in this paper is, however, limited to the BAA. 
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commencement of the Act. In Gumede v President of the Republic of South 
Africa,5 the Constitutional Court changed the rules governing the division of 
assets when dissolving pre-recognition marriages after 2008. The Court ruled 
that s 7(1) and (2) of the RCMA were constitutionally invalid and it declared 
that customary marriages entered into before the commencement of the RCMA 
do not necessarily continue to be governed by customary law. Moseneke DCJ 
stated that ‘the effect of the order we are to make is that all customary marriages 
would become marriages in community of property.’6 Therefore the legal 
position of the property relations of parties who married before the Act adhere to 
the Act provided they are monogamous marriages. Polygamous marriages, 
which were entered into prior to the commencement of the Act, continue to be 
regulated by customary law. 
 
The interrelationship between customary law and the RMCA under the new 
constitutional dispensation, particularly in the area of dissolution of a customary 
marriage, is an under-researched area. Higgins et al. (2007) argued that in 
recognising both the right to gender equality and to culture, the South African 
Constitution set up a potential conflict in the context of customary marriage. 
Weeks believes that this potential conflict leads to uncertainty as “the plurality 
of laws and authorities under which women live, means that the task of securing 
women’s rights is unpredictable” (2011: 156). She urged scholars to firstly 
understand the “complexity of relations between institutions” but also the ways 
in which women negotiate with different authorities and institutions. In what 
follows, we will present the complexity of relations between these institutions, 
particularly how they relate to the division of marital property, before we 
examine how women negotiate the different authorities and institutions.  
 
One significant ‘complexity of relation’ between the institutions rests in the 
different understanding and definition of ‘property’. As Mbatha outlined, 
customary forms of property are classified into personal and family (2005: 45). 
Personal property could be understood to refer to property amassed by the 
individual or the married couple whereas family property refers to property 
placed under the administration of the heir through customary inheritance. 
Mbatha argued that family members who are not heirs may be further 
disadvantaged in accessing family property as the family property may now 
form part of the community of property of a marital couple (2005: 46). 
Additionally, it was argued that the failure of the RCMA to prevent this from 
happening is a gross oversight as the aim of RCMA was to guard against unfair 
enrichment of the customary heir and spouse. Furthermore, Mbatha (2005) 
                                         
5
 Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa [2008] ZACC 23; 2009 
(3) BCLR 243 (CC); 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC). 
6 Para 51. 
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argued that reforming customary marriage was undertaken in a way that 
followed the provisions and protections enjoyed by civil marriages (under the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961) without developing it in ways which were more 
innovative and specific to addressing substantive inequality. Mamashela echoed 
these concerns as she highlighted the inadequate conceptualisation of a 
matrimonial home (ikhaya) in The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, on 
which RCMA is modelled (2004: 633). She argued that the matrimonial home 
serves a number of important functions and given the diverse demands on and 
interest in an African home, the idea of its co-ownership by a married couple 
with a view to selling it at the end of a marriage may not be easy to actualise. 
Moreover, her study revealed that the ‘movable’ nature of property, in the form 
of wages, left it very difficult for deserted wives to access a share and the notion 
of community of property was an illusion rather than a reality (Mamashela, 
2004). 
 
A second significant ‘complexity of relation’ lies between the institutions of 
codified customary law and living customary law. Codified customary law, in 
relation to the financial consequences of the dissolution of a customary 
marriage, maintained that an individual’s source of support is the extended 
family. It was supposed that the maintenance of wives following the dissolution 
of a marriage was protected, as lobola was seen as provision of security for the 
wife if she had to return to her natal family (South African Law Report on 
Customary Marriages: 122). Living customary law, argued by Himonga (2011), 
evolves and is not monolithic. It recognises that norms and values may change 
over time, through contact with other cultures or socio-economic contexts. The 
fact that lobolo is mostly paid in cash nowadays (Shope, 2006; Posel and 
Rudwick, 2011) means that lobolo is a less predictable way of securing 
women’s financial position in marriage. Unfortunately there is little evidence of 
the living law regarding whether the extended family provide support for 
women following the dissolution of a customary marriage. Budlender et al. 
(2011) found that only 40 out of 79 divorced participants reported that they lived 
in their parents’ area following the breakdown of their marriage. The evidence 
does not indicate that all women or the vast majority of them return to their natal 
kin.  The evidence both in the past (Burman, 1987; Mamashela, 2004) and more 
recently (Budlender et al. 2011) is that women experience financial hardship of 
marital dissolution most severely which may suggest that family networks 
cannot always be relied upon. While the evidence remains unsatisfying, it 
appears that the woman’s family is not always in a position to support her 
following the breakdown of a marriage. 
 
A third significant ‘complexity of relation’ between the institutions is the 
inexplicit eradication of customary law in regulating the dissolution of 
customary marriages; the power to dissolve a customary marriage no longer 
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remains a private or a community affair. As stated above, a customary marriage 
may only be dissolved by a court by a decree of divorce (Section 8(1) of the 
RCMA). The role of the extrajudicial system, including families and traditional 
leaders has been replaced by the RCMA. The extrajudicial system has no 
authority and power relative to the judicial system and are, for example, unable 
to award a divorce, determine maintenance matters or forfeiture of benefits or 
award pension interests from one spouse to another (Bronstein, 2000: 560). The 
legislature decided to entrust the courts with the task of protecting the interests 
of women who exit a customary marriage, rather than leaving it to the private 
realm. However, courts are often the last place where individuals will seek 
recourse to resolve a marital dispute, due partly to the problems of access 
(Griffiths, 1997; Higgins et al., 2006; van der Waal, 2004). The legislature may 
therefore have overlooked the challenges individuals encounter in accessing the 
Courts and may have overlooked possible ways of regulating marital property 
by drawing on the support of the extrajudicial system.  
 
Overall, there is mixed research evidence in relation to how property is divided 
upon the dissolution of a marriage under customary law. On the one hand, there 
is evidence which supports the idea that a fair distribution of property on 
dissolution of a customary union was not foreign to indigenous African law in 
South Africa (Bennett, 1991: 277). In this respect, Van de Meide (1999) argued 
that in some instances, if the husband initiated the divorce for no good reason, 
the property would be divided between the spouses. Moreover, other research 
conducted into property consequences of divorce under customary law in 
Zambia found that lower courts in urban areas ordered husbands to pay lump 
sums to wives as compensation for their contribution to the matrimonial 
property, as well as giving them a share of other matrimonial property on 
divorce (Himonga, 1987). However there is more recent evidence in South 
Africa which demonstrates how women are deserted and unable to access 
marital property following the dissolution of a customary marriage (Burman, 
1987; Mamshela, 2004). Burman (1987) examined this experience by drawing 
on data from court records, interviews and court observations. Her study 
conducted in the mid-80s occurred before the enactment of the RCMA, at a time 
when there was very poor state legal protection for individuals in customary 
marriages. Mamashela (2004) attempted to examine how, following the 
enactment of RCMA, marital property was divided between spouses on divorce 
but she was unable to locate ‘detailed’ divorce files involving people in 
customary marriages. Her study therefore outlined the experiences of women 
who were deserted by their husbands and failed to examine how the State 
divided marital property in divorce cases. When we consider the limited 
evidence provided by these studies, in light of the ‘complexities of relations’ 
between the institutions outline above, the questions remain regarding how 
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judicial and extrajudicial systems are regulating the redistribution of property 
upon the dissolution of marriage.  
 
 
3. Marital Dissolution and Divorce in South 
Africa: What the numbers say? 
 
The 2011 Census indicated that 525 792 black South Africans were officially 
separated or divorced. Budlender et al. (2004) warn us of the difficulties in 
obtaining ‘appropriate’ data on divorce in South Africa, as the legal and 
sociological views of what constitutes marital dissolution match in some cases, 
but not in all. It has been argued by different scholars in South Africa that there 
are significant practical challenges in dissolving marriages – including attendant 
payments between families (Hosegood et al., 2009), barriers to litigation by 
women, (Burman, 1987) and traditional customs that allowed men to take 
additional wives (Hosegood et al., 2009). These challenges have prevented 
individuals from pursuing formal divorces through state courts both before and 
after 2000, when the RCMA came into force. It has also been argued that many 
marriages are dissolved informally within families (Mamashela, 2004) and that 
these dissolutions are not registered. Since marital breakdown and marriage 
dissolution can be formal or informal, relying on the official number of divorced 
and separated black South Africans, based on administrative data such as court 
records, may overlook a wider prevalence of marital breakdown which may be 
better captured through survey data and other research methods. 
 
This was found to be the case more recently, in a survey of 3 000 women, 
Budlender et al. (2011) found that very few women in the study reported that 
they were separated or had been deserted by their partner. In fact, the survey 
yielded responses from only 79 women who reported being divorced, separated 
or abandoned (approximately 2.6 percent) (Budlender et al. 2011). Yet the 
researchers noted that when an additional 110 women who reported that they 
were married were asked to list all the homestead members – excluding those 
who had not come home in the last two years – no husband or partner was listed. 
Budlender et al. argued that this group “do not seem to be firmly in a marriage” 
(2011: 78). This research evidence strengthens the concern that the number of 
divorced and effectively separated or abandoned women may be greater than is 
revealed by the administrative or survey data on marital status. Furthermore, 
Burman used the term ‘remnant families’ (1987: 207), defined as a family in 
which the ex-husband (by any system of law) has left, to describe families with 
differing legal entitlements of support following the breakdown of the marriage. 
It is for these reasons that a broader understanding of marital dissolution is both 
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required and adopted by the authors. The broader understanding of marital 
dissolution includes women who are separated, deserted and divorced. 
 
A brief overview of the socio-economic context of black divorced individuals in 
South Africa, based on an analysis of survey data (the Community Survey data 
in 2007), demonstrate that divorcees are a particularly vulnerable group.7 Firstly, 
almost twice as many women as men are separated or divorced. Although 
separated and divorced women have the highest rates of employment of all 
African women over the age of 14 (relative to other marital status groups), the 
number of divorcees with no income is considerable. Almost one in seven men 
and women who are divorced (15 per cent) have no annual household income. 
This compares to 5.7 per cent of men and women in civil marriages and 7.3 per 
cent of men and women in customary marriages. When we look at these 
findings, we see that 35 per cent of divorcees, 25 per cent of men and women in 
customary marriages and 15 per cent of men and women in civil marriages live 
off less than R800 per month. These findings have important bearing on the 
financial consequences of the dissolution of a marriage. If almost twice as many 






To obtain a picture of the financial consequences of the dissolution of a 
customary marriage, this paper analyses a subset of the data which comprises of 
the following three sets of data: 1) 30 divorce cases drawn from a Regional 
Court; 2) 21 semi-structured interviews with divorcees who self-identified as 
separated or divorced;8 and 3) 82 responses to a ‘division of asset’ vignette. A 
brief description of each data set follows. 
 
 
A. Court Files  
 
The research team reviewed the divorce records from regional courts in one of 
the sampled provinces.9 These courts were all established as regional courts in 
                                         
7 Unfortunately the figures presented on divorce do not distinguish between those who 
obtained a divorce from a customary marriage or civil marriage. 
8 Divorce and marriage dissolution can be formal or informal. Some people who consider 
themselves divorced are not considered divorced from the perspective of the State but may be 
considered divorced by members of their community. Therefore in recruiting a sample of 
‘divorcees’, we included any individual who self-identified as a divorcee. 
9 The name of the province is being withheld deliberately for ethical reasons. 
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2010.10 The court had records of divorce files from 2003. At the court, an 
officer, who was appointed to assist the researcher, pulled out all the records on 
customary marriages he could find for the years 2003 to 2009. These files were 
stored on the shelves and in cabinets according to the years in which the cases 
were filed. The researchers carried out a content analysis of 25 divorce files 
involving marriages which were concluded following the commencement of the 
Act and 5 divorces of customary marriages which were concluded before 2000 
but were terminated following the Gumede ruling.  
 
 
B. Interview Data 
 
This paper also draws on semi-structured interviews with 21 participants who 
self-identified as separated or divorced. Participants in the selected sites were 
recruited to attend an information session regarding the ‘new laws’ and over 200 
people attended the information sessions. The interview sample was drawn from 
this group. We also adopted snowballing methods of sampling whereby the 
researchers identified people in the community who met the sampling criteria 
and we snowballed from the first set of participants.  
 
All interviews were conducted in the first language of the participant, which 
included Xhosa, Zulu, Sepedi and Tswana. The interview guide used during 
interviews contained four sections, of which those sections relevant to this 
article focus on the financial arrangements following the dissolution of the 
marriage. We asked open-ended, non-directive questions about these processes. 
 
Both authors participated in carrying out the data analysis and engaged with the 
analysis stages by following the “conceptual scaffoldings” approach outlined by 
Spencer et al. (2003: 213). This method involves three overlapping stages. The 
first stage involved sorting and reducing the data by generating a set of codes. 
We used ‘division of matrimonial property’ as the initial broad analytic code; we 
coded all data relating to division of matrimonial property and from these codes 
derived more specifically into different structural codes based on the different 
outcomes of division. In the second stage of analysis the nuances and tensions 
within each category were analysed and incorporated into the analysis. The 
outcome of the division of the matrimonial property had two particular 
dimensions: firstly, whether the division was contested or uncontested and 
secondly, the system in which the dispute took place, either in the judicial or 
extrajudicial system.  
 
                                         
10 The regional courts were established in terms of the Magistrates Courts Act 32 of 1944, as 
amended by the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008. 
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C. Vignette Data 
 
The majority of the participants in the study, including married individuals, 
divorcees, participants who had experienced an intestate succession case in their 
family, and traditional leaders, were presented with six identical written 
vignettes. Vignettes can be defined as stimuli, presented in the form of 
contextualised situations, to which respondents are asked to respond (Finch, 
1987: 105). For the purpose of this paper, we have used the results of one of the 
vignettes that presented participants with scenarios about fictitious characters 
who had married in community of property and explained that the husband 
wanted to leave the marriage but refused to share the property. The conflict 
posed in the vignette stems from the differences between how judicial and 
extrajudicial systems regulate the financial aspects of the dissolution of a 
customary marriage. In responding to the vignettes, the participants were 
required to advise the vignette characters on what the right course of action 
would be in this situation. Thus, the vignettes investigated the perceptions and 
not the practices of the participants. Overall, 82 participants responded to this 
vignette. This sample included 16 traditional leaders, 14 divorcees, 39 married 
women, and 13 married men.  
 
The responses were coded similarly to the interview data. In the analysis of the 
vignettes, ‘choice of support system’ was used as the initial broad analytical 
concept. Once the initial codes were created, more specific concepts were 
derived to explore the nuances within each code and the tensions between 
different codes. For example, for ‘state courts’, concepts such as ‘powers of 
compulsion’ and ‘powers of protection’ were created to explain the respondents’ 
perceptions about state courts and why they believed that such forums should be 
turned to in the vignette situation.11   
 
The findings will be presented by outlining 1) the division of matrimonial 
property following the dissolution of a customary marriage inside the court; 2) 
the division of marital property that takes place outside the court; and 3) 
normative agreement and disagreement regarding the just solution to a division 





                                         
11 For more details on the analysis of the vignette data, see (reference withdrawn). 
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5. Division of Matrimonial Property: A View 
from Inside the Courts 
 
In reviewing the findings from inside the courts we will firstly examine whether 
the parties identified the correct property regime before we review whether the 
courts applied the correct property regime.  
 
 
A. Uncontested Cases 
 
In an analysis of the uncontested cases, despite the RCMA recognising women’s 
equal share in the property amassed during the marriage, these orders relegated 
women who married after 2000 to the ongoing system that allows husbands to 
retain the assets. The economic position of the woman in many cases has been 
disadvantaged. As presented in Table 1 below, the division of the property in 12 
of the 30 divorce cases reviewed was not contested. The plaintiff was the 
husband in seven of these cases and the husbands’ claims in these cases 
specified the distribution of assets in the following ways: 1) division of the joint 
estate (four cases); and 2) each party to keep whatever was in his/her possession 
(three cases). The findings indicate that the plaintiff (husband) identified and 
pleaded the incorrect property regime in three cases. In all cases the plaintiffs 
were legally represented. The findings suggest that the lawyers involved in these 
cases may be unaware of the parties’ entitlements under the Act or they may 
think the court will not uphold the principles of the Act and they therefore 
advise their client accordingly. 
 
 
Table 1: Description of the divorce files (n=25) 
 Post-recognition marriages (n=25) 
Case Contested (13) Uncontested (12) 









More importantly, the findings reveal that the courts are not always adhering to 
the principles of equality embedded in the RCMA. This occurs both explicitly 
and inexplicitly. In terms of the court order, in three out of the nine uncontested, 
completed divorce cases, the property order did not align with the provisions of 
the RCMA, as the estate was not divided and shared, but the parties left the 
marriage with their own possessions. Proper remedies are not issued by the 
courts and this is an explicit form of injustice and neglect, as well as an implicit 
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denial of access to the parties. The court ought to be the place for the real 
enforcement of the Act, but this does not happen as the judges are not always 
applying the proper matrimonial property system. 
 
The study also found that the approach adopted by the courts to regulating the 
matrimonial property regime leads to uncertain outcomes. While the court grants 
orders for the division of the property, the vagueness of the framing of 
redistribution orders and the lack of adequate/appropriate involvement by the 
lawyers representing the parties, creates uncertainty for the parties. An order 
alone is not sufficient to guarantee the joint division of the estate.  
 
The challenge involved in dividing the joint estate was highlighted in case 25. In 
this case, the female plaintiff, who was a teacher, returned to court three months 
after she obtained a divorce decree, to seek the appointment of a receiver. The 
Court ordered the division of the joint estate but the parties were unable to 
divide the joint estate. In the application, the nature of the relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant was described as “so odd that any attempt at settling 
the division of the joint estate without the aid of a duly appointed liquidator 
would be fruitless in that they are not on speaking terms.” The appointment of 
the receiver outlined the series of tasks necessary to be undertaken to divide the 
estate. These tasks included collection of debts due to the joint estate, paying the 
liabilities of the joint estate, preparation of a final account between the parties, 
and division of the assets of the joint estate after payment of its liabilities in 
accordance with the account. How the parties carry out the ‘division of the 
estate’ is not currently being supervised. This highlights the inexplicit injustice 
being committed at the Court level and it places a certain degree of doubt about 
whether the new Act is protecting the vulnerable spouse in practice. 
 
 
B. Contested Cases 
 
As presented in Table 1 above, 13 of the divorce applications were contested on 
the basis of the financial division of the assets.12 A further problem was observed 
in several cases whereby litigants were drawing on codified customary law to 
justify their claim to an uneven share of matrimonial property instead of the 
RCMA. This is problematic, as it means that legal representation is misleading 
the litigants and misrepresenting their claims. The majority of these applications 
were brought by the husband who sought an unequal division of the assets in his 
pleadings. For example, in case 17, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant wife 
was an alcoholic. The couple had been married for five years. The plaintiff 
                                         
12 In some of these cases, it is unclear whether the division of the movable and immovable 
items represent an ‘equal division of the joint estate.’ 
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pleaded for a forfeiture of matrimonial benefits. The husband was employed as a 
teacher and the wife was a low-earning secretary. The couple had a 2-year-old 
child. The wife sought half of the husband’s pension fund and the joint division 
of the estate. The court ordered the joint estate to be divided. It ruled that half of 
the plaintiff's pension interests be held by the fund and be paid to the defendant 
when such benefits become due and payable. While the outcome of the case 
demonstrates that the Courts have played a role in guarding against the 
traditional customary law bias in favour of husbands, the lack of appropriate 
legal advice by the lawyers representing the parties is weakening the 
implementation of the Act within the judicial system. 
 
The study also found that some women were seeking specific orders relating to a 
share in the husband’s pension (six cases) and spousal maintenance (three 
cases). Although the Courts are upholding the principles of RMCA in some of 
these cases the findings reveal other important gaps in how they are failing to 
advance and promote the implementation of the RCMA. Two important issues 
arise regarding the outcomes of spousal maintenance and pension applications. 
Firstly, the courts are not giving guidance to these intricate systems, as to why 
spousal maintenance would not be paid for a longer period or why access to a 
pension is delayed until the pension entitlements have accrued.  
 
In case number 5, the couple had been married for four years and they had no 
children. The female defendant had sought spousal maintenance of R1 500 per 
month for 24 months. The court ordered the defendant to pay R500 for three 
months only. There was no information available regarding the parties’ 
respective employment status and there was no explanation provided as to why 
spousal maintenance would not be paid for a longer period. The court files 
revealed that judges did not explain the reasons for their judgments, even in 
cases that are contested. There is no indication of what they are taking into 
account if they do not indicate clearly what matrimonial property they are 
awarding and why they are awarding it.  This is very significant as there is 
uncertainty regarding what the estate comprises of and whether it includes 
access to spousal income. 
 
In another divorce case involving a claim for pension entitlements, there was no 
guidance from the court as to why the payment of pension benefits could only be 
paid at a later date.  In this case, the wife was the primary carer of a 4-year-old 
and the Court ordered the wife to obtain pension benefits from her husband’s 
fund when such benefits became due and payable. While an endorsement is 
made on the pension fund at the time of divorce thus registering the interest of 
the divorced spouse, the ex-wife cannot cash in her claim to the pension 
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benefit.13 This seems to be an inappropriate remedy or source of income for a 
primary carer and ex-wife who would probably have less of a demand for it at 
some point in the future as (1) she herself may receive a government pension; 
(2) the children she is raising may become independent; and/or (3) another wife 
may have a claim to it as well.  
 
 
C. Orders in post-2008 divorces cases 
 
There were two court cases involving customary marriages which were 
concluded before 2000 and were dissolved after 2008, following the Gumede 
ruling. In these two cases, the court files did not provide any evidence to suggest 
that the plaintiff or the court had investigated all the circumstances relevant to 
the customary marriage. This is the practice revealed in this study despite 
Moseneke DCJ14 urging the court to examine “all the circumstances relevant to 
the customary marriage and in particular the manner in which the property of the 
marriage has been acquired, controlled and used by the parties concerned.” In 
these cases, as mentioned previously, the court did not present clear definitions 
of ‘estate’ or ‘equal’ despite the plaintiff’s desire for more direction. In one of 
these cases (case 32), the couple had been married for 39 years. The wife was 
unemployed and the husband was self-employed as a taxi owner. The wife 
sought an equal share in the taxi business. She argued that she had supported the 
husband throughout his long spells of unemployment. She claimed she bought 
the taxi and other assets such as cattle, and that he chased her from the common 
home and she had to stay with her younger sister. The husband denied the 
allegations. The court ordered an equal division of the joint estate. The judgment 
by Moseneke J provides guidance only as far as saying that all customary 
marriages are ‘in community of property’, but it is unclear what constitutes 
property in this case and how the woman in this case managed to obtain a share 
in the business. 
 
Overall the findings from inside the Courts demonstrate that the Courts are 
explicitly and inexplicitly negligent in how they are re-distributing marital assets 
upon the dissolution of a customary marriage. In some cases the Courts are not 
adhering to the principles in RCMA. Moreover, they are not providing adequate 
instruction regarding how a ‘joint estate’ should be divided or why they are 
awarding specific spousal maintenance or pension benefits. This is coupled with 
a failure to explain what the framing of redistribution requires. Given such 
remiss, it is unclear how women’s rights to marital property following the 
dissolution of a customary marriage are being promoted by the Courts. 
                                         
13
 For details, see s 37D of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
14
 Gumede (n 13) para 52. 
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6. Division of Matrimonial Property: A View 
from Outside the Courts 
 
The findings presented here focus on women’s experience of negotiating the 
different authorities and institutions involved in regulating the division of 
marital property. In only two out of 21 cases, the women retained the family 
home by drawing on the support of both the extrajudicial and the judicial 
system. In the first case, Martha15 was able to remain in occupation of the home 
with the support from the traditional leader and the Court: 
 
‘The chief said there’s nothing to be shared, this place belongs to me 
therefore when one leaves it, it comes back to me. In our culture 
there’s no sharing when a man leaves his wife, he just leaves alone 
and leaves everything to his wife. Your husband’s properties are 
yours. My husband said that the court said we must share the property. 
I then asked him what does he want to leave behind. He [my husband] 
said we can’t talk about the house but we can share other things. I said 
I would be happy if you can tell me what you want. He said he would 
write them down and when he’s done he would come back and show 
me. When I opened the letter there was nothing about sharing, it only 
stated that he was selling the house. I wanted a lawyer. I got a lawyer 
and the lawyer said I mustn’t worry about these things. I must stay in 
the house. He [the husband] never came back again.’  
 
The support of the traditional leader encouraged Martha to remain in the family 
home in the immediate period following the breakdown of the marriage. 
However, Martha’s husband still sought a claim in the home. In order to secure 
her long term position in the home she sought support by seeking and obtaining 
the intervention of a lawyer. The assistance she received from both extrajudicial 
and judicial sources ensured access to the home both in the short-term and long-
term. This combination and interaction provided a more holistic mechanism of 
protection of her marital property rights.  
 
In the second case, Violet also drew on extrajudicial and judicial sources, to 
assist her in claiming her right to remain in the family home in the immediate 
violent period following the breakdown of the marriage. After Violet obtained 
the support of the wider family network to stay in the home, she sought long 
term security from the Courts as she applied for a protection order against her 
former husband. Although Violet had not yet obtained a divorce, she remained 
                                         
15 All major identifiers (names of individuals, specific locations) were removed from data. and 
pseudonyms are used. 
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living in the marital home and was able to support herself by renting out two or 
three rooms in the house. 
 
The cases outlined above however are not typical. In the majority of cases 
women experienced the dissolution of their customary marriage through the 
extrajudicial system only where matrimonial property rights, granted under the 
RCMA, were not recognised. In 18 out of 21 cases, the husband retained the 
marital property and the wife ‘took her clothes’. The experiences reveal different 
reasons why women did not pursue a stake in the marital home. There were two 
main reasons for this finding. Firstly, women (and their families) continued to 
regard themselves as disentitled, they did not believe that they had a right to 
such property: “yes, I just came with my clothes. He is the one who was packing 
for me. I wasn’t working.” 
 
There was also a strong belief that the marital home belonged to the husband. 
This finding resonates with existing research which argues that women in 
customary marriages still perceive themselves as minors and incapable of 
owning property (Mamashela, 2004). The wife  did not question her husband’s 
authority. She did not feel or believe that she had contributed to the household 
by being a wife and she certainly did not believe she had a claim to the marital 
home. Mamashela (2004: 632) argued that movable assets are bought with the 
husband’s money and therefore ‘belong’ to him. She argued that aspects of co-
ownership and co-management espoused in community of property are an 
illusion for most women who were married before 2000. This issue has now 
been clarified by the judgment awarded in Gumede and women who were 
married before 2000, who divorce after the Gumede ruling, are considered to be 
married in community of property. 
 
Secondly, some women were aware of their right to marital property but were 
unwilling to exercise this right. In some cases divorcees expressed concern that 
sharing in the marital property would be considered inappropriate by the wider 
extended family. In particular, women whose marriages were of shorter duration 
were concerned about being referred to as ‘gold diggers’: 
 
‘I left them (the property) with him. [Why?] There would have been 
problems. It was going to raise problems where his family says our 
child has worked hard now you are taking his things and going to your 
family (three-year marriage) so I just took my child and left.’ 
 
In several other cases, participants were concerned that seeking a claim in the 
marital property was not worth the fight. In one such case, Amanda, an 
employed administrative clerk from Johannesburg, explained how angry she felt 
about the unequal division of assets. Amanda explained that despite her 
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frustration with walking away ‘empty handed’, it was ‘less trouble’ to leave the 
marriage empty-handed than to fight for more: 
 
‘I hate it. I'm angry and I've wasted my years for nothing since I got 
out with nothing that I acquired.  I've worked but at the end of the day 
I just got out with nothing I only got out with my clothes you 
understand.’ 
 
In yet other cases, the wife walked away from the marital property as the need to 
separate from a violent husband was critical. In such situations, it was better to 
walk away and start afresh, even if it resulted in increased financial strain. In 
these cases, the women did not believe that they didn’t deserve a stake in the 
matrimonial property. Instead they chose to walk away rather than encounter 




7. Perceptions regarding the Division of 
Matrimonial Property upon marital dissolution 
 
In what follows, we will present the main findings from the responses to the 
vignette which dealt with the division of matrimonial property upon exit out of a 
customary marriage. We will outline the reasons put forward by men, women, 
divorcees and traditional leaders for either supporting or resisting the equal 
division of matrimonial property upon marital dissolution.  
 
 
A. Support for the Equal Division of Matrimonial 
Property upon Marital Dissolution 
 
The majority of the participants (59 out of 83) believed that a couple should 
share the marital assets upon the dissolution of the marriage. Just under half of 
the traditional leaders (n=7) believed that agreeing to get married in community 
of property placed a binding obligation on both spouses to share their property 
in the event of a divorce. In holding such opinions, the traditional leaders 
advised women to turn to the courts to resolve the matter posed in the vignette.  
In doing so, they demonstrated their awareness of a woman’s right to an equal 






‘The law will not discard this [other] person on things that belong to 
her as well … when you are breaking [up] your marriage the law 
demands that you share these things; you cannot do as you will, it is 
the law.’  
 
Nine of the fourteen divorcees who answered the vignette believed that the 
female vignette character should turn to the court for assistance with this matter. 
This belief was held on the basis that the couple had (1) a valid marriage and (2) 
an agreement that the marriage was in community of property: 
 
‘The marriage is lawful and it was in community so there’s no choice. 
Nolundi [vignette character] should take legal steps to force Moses 
[vignette character] to pay because he had had an agreement with her.’ 
 
All 13 male married participants who responded to this vignette unequivocally 
stated that the agreement is binding and should not be contested. There was 
widespread agreement among the male participants that the vignette character 
should go to court and that the court would force the husband to share the assets. 
Dealing with the matter in this manner would avoid further confrontation with 
her husband.  
 
Three of the male participants believed that the agreement could, however, be 
broken if either party was responsible for breaking up the marriage – for 
example, if he or she had an extramarital affair and ‘left’ the marriage. In such 
cases, the guilty spouse was expected to ‘take their things and leave the house’. 
 
It depends on the cause of the divorce. Who was wrong? If she is wrong, there’s 
no way she should get it because she’d probably misuse my property or my 
money. [What if the man was wrong?] No there’s no way, if the man was wrong 
he’d not solely get it. They would have to share the property. 
 
In response to the vignette, the overwhelming majority of female married 
respondents (30 out of 39 respondents) reflected the perception that the female 
vignette characters should turn to the judicial system for support in the 
resolution of these disputes. Many respondents expressed the view that, in 
agreeing to marry in community of property, a binding obligation was placed 
upon both spouses to share their property in the event of a divorce: “Once you 
are in community of property, you are committing and tying yourself.”  
 
Furthermore, the perception was implicitly reflected by some of the respondents 
that there could be more protection for the woman in the vignette if the matter 
were resolved in court rather than within the family. They expressed the view 
that one way in which the woman in the vignette could avoid the suffering and 
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conflict by trying to resolve this matter within the family, would be to turn to the 
judicial system for assistance and protection. 
 
The findings highlight how the principles embedded in RCMA are accepted and 
are part of how different actors in the community perceive a just solution to the 
division of matrimonial property following the dissolution of a customary 




B. Resistance to the Redistribution of Matrimonial 
Property upon Marital Dissolution 
 
There continues to be a significant level of resistance to the equal division of 
matrimonial property following the dissolution of a customary marriage and 
these beliefs are held by men, women, divorcees and traditional leaders. Nine 
out of 17 traditional leaders believed that the matters should be addressed by 
more traditional dispute resolution forums such as the family.  
 
These traditional leaders also believed that the dispute had no basis for two 
reasons. Firstly, they did not regard the concept of community of property as 
part of customary marriages and, secondly, they did not regard divorce as 
something that happened within customary marriages.  One traditional leader 
explained why this matter was not a matter for the court, as he rejected the idea 
of individual ownership or a wife’s claim to marital assets: 
 
‘So, in customary law, number one, there’s no community of property 
because the relationship between husband and wife in customary 
marriage takes the understanding that everything is owned by the 
family. I work for my children. The wife is there as a custodian of our 
things together towards the children, and she can’t take my stuff and 
take 50 per cent and go spend it with another man [if she leaves].’  
 
The traditional leaders who expressed such beliefs argued that customary 
marriages are centred on the family home and children.   In essence, the interests 
of the family and children take precedence over individual rights. Consequently 
neither men nor women had personal property rights. If either parent wants to 
leave the marriage, they do so, but are not entitled to remove assets from the 
children’s home. These perceptions do not incorporate the legal principles of the 
RCMA, which were intended to improve the economic position of women upon 
dissolution of their customary marriages. One of the problems inherent in the 
responses of traditional leaders under consideration is the lack of reflection by 
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the traditional leaders about why some marriages may have to end. In a context 
of high levels of intimate partner violence (Abrahams et al., 2009), not 
recognising the variety of reasons why a spouse may be forced to leave a 
marriage is not addressing the needs of certain members of the community. 
 
Although there appears to be consensus among this group of traditional leaders 
that marital assets are built up for the children, the husband’s claim to property, 
should he depart, is unclear. Five of the nine traditional leaders believe that 
marital assets belong to the husband only: 
 
‘In terms of our Ndebele culture; if the relationship reaches a dead 
end, the woman gets nothing from the family assets. According to our 
culture, the woman leaves the marriage with nothing. The man takes 
all the assets.’ 
 
The belief that divorced women are not automatically entitled to a share in the 
matrimonial property is still held among some rural-based divorcees too. There 
were five participants who did not believe that the matter was best resolved by 
the court. Resonating with some of the perceptions held by the traditional 
leaders, three of the participants felt that the spouse who leaves the marriage 
should not receive any share in the marital property: ‘He must just leave the 
house his property behind and start afresh.’ This belief is held on the basis that 
the wife is still willing to remain in the marriage and should not be punished for 
the husband’s desire to leave. A few divorcees argued that the wife is not 
entitled to any share in the marital property. Thulile, an unemployed divorcee 
with two children and a seventeen-year marriage, held the belief based on the 
idea that the wife did not contribute economically to the marital property: 
 
‘When I leave, I cannot say I am taking all the things. I need to 
understand that I was not working; he was the one who was working 
so when he says we are not sharing them, I need to accept that he 
doesn’t want me and he doesn’t want me to take anything.’  
 
It is unclear whether this perception is based on compliance with living 
customary law and normative agreement within her community or ignorance of 
the new laws. We cannot tell whether the participant’s view would change if she 
knew that she was entitled to a share in the matrimonial property.   
 
The perceptions of the participants equate to living customary law and tell us 
something about why living customary law will remain crucial despite the 
introduction of the RCMA. There were different reasons offered as to why 
women should leave a marriage with nothing. The duration of the marriage, 
problems with upsetting relationships with the extended family, and the 
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importance of economic contributions were the main reasons behind a 
participant’s belief that a woman should not obtain a share of the assets. 
 
 
8. Compliance, Dissonance and Challenges 
 
The findings show that the final judgment in relation to the division of 
matrimonial property may be made by a range of actors involved in both the 
judicial and extrajudicial system. The findings reveal that both the judicial and 
the extrajudicial system support and prevent the advancement of women’s rights 
to property following the dissolution of a customary marriage.  
 
Contrary to what we may believe, the findings demonstrate that the Courts are 
failing to consistently recognise women’s right to an equitable distribution of the 
marital estate upon divorce. It is unclear how and why the court contravened the 
principles contained in the RCMA in some cases thus further research is 
required to investigate this gap. Our study revealed that the failure to uphold the 
principles in RCMA is occurring both explicitly in terms of the Court order and 
inexplicitly, in terms of how the courts are too vague in the framing of 
redistribution orders. The legislature, through the enactment of RCMA, has 
brought cultural norms within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. However, the 
Courts, despite the plea from Moseneke J., have failed to interpret and provide 
guidance on how the two systems should interact. Thus, despite the emphasis 
placed on the role of the judiciary in the protection of women’s rights in South 
Africa (Himonga, 2012), and unlike the studies in other jurisdictions which 
show that drawing on judicial systems can robustly serve the needs of women in 
human rights protections (Loper, 2012), our findings highlight the failings of the 
judicial system in this regard, particularly with respect to customary marriages. 
 
The study also found that many individuals are still relying on extrajudicial 
systems to manage their marriage dissolution. In such cases, women’s rights to 
matrimonial property are often overlooked. This practice may stem from the 
strong belief held by divorcees and traditional leaders that marital assets belong 
to the husband (and husband’s family) only. In addition, there are widely held 
perceptions that the individual who leaves a marriage should not benefit 
financially as a result of leaving the marriage. These beliefs continue to support 
notions of family property held by men alone, to the economic detriment of 
women as wives and caregivers. Denying the prevalence of the dissolution of 
customary marriages, as some traditional leaders do, also supports the traditional 
ways of organising and regulating property. There are significant emotional and 
social issues relating to claiming matrimonial property, and women often prefer 
or need low-conflict dissolution. In addition, the under-evaluation of non-
financial contributions together with wives’ lack of knowledge of their 
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husband’s income and assets disadvantage them at the time of marital 
breakdown. 
 
Higgins et al. argued that the persistence of customary practices in the face of 
statutory and constitutional reforms together with the continuation of traditional 
institutions suggest that meaningful reform of customary marriage will depend 
on the support of traditional authorities (2007: 1708). While we agree that the 
role of traditional authorities is critical, we argue that the use of a combination 
of these authorities and judicial mechanisms may offer a more holistic and 
helpful approach. This was evident in the cases where some individuals drew on 
both judicial and extrajudicial support to claim their right to a share in 
matrimonial property. Drawing on both systems allowed the participants to 
overcome short term challenges to remaining in the family home and gave them 
a stronger position from which they could claim their rights to a share in the 
property through the judicial system. 
 
The evidence to the vignette suggests that perceptions are changing and people 
have a critical distance from the custom they follow and that practices are 
continually being reassessed by those that live by them. What is important to 
note is that perceptions about how to resolve the redistribution of assets 
following marital dissolution has no single unified response, as people are not 
unified and uncritical of the custom. When a woman comes to court or contests 
the outcome of the divorce, the fight is between two different interest groups 
battling to retain power relations within their culture – a culture which is 
evolving in a manner that promises compliance with constitutional principles or 
imperatives embedded in the RCMA. This finding demonstrates that living 
customary law as it is currently practiced is evolving, as is observed in the cases 
where the division of the assets was disputed.  
 
The paper argues that women’s rights to matrimonial property are not protected 
exclusively in the official enclave. It has shown how the official enclave is 
failing in this regard. The paper has shown how extrajudicial systems are also 
supporting women’s rights to matrimonial property although this is not always 
the case. Like other scholars have argued in the past (Griffiths, 1997; Higgins et 
al., 2007; Weeks, 2011), we would argue that meaningful reform of customary 
marriage will depend on the support of all institutions within the judicial and 
extrajudicial system. Therefore, the authors urge the State to focus their 
attention to creating synergies between these institutions rather than prioritising 
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